Posts Tagged ‘Supreme Court’

Police allowed to track cell phones in US without court warrants

Friday, November 9th, 2012

The US Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that Americans have no reasonable expectation of privacy when carrying cell phones, allowing police to track GPS signals without a warrant or probable cause.

The decision came the court ruled in United States v. Skinner that the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) abided by the Constitution by using a drug runner’s cellphone data to track his location and determine his identity.

Melvin Skinner, also known by his false name as “Big Foot,” was a drug mule with more than 1,100 pounds of marijuana in his Texas motorhome.

The throwaway mobile phone he was using was registered under a false name, so agents did not know the identity of the drug trafficker.

By using GPS data from his disposable phone, police learned that “Big Foot” was planning to deliver a large shipment of marijuana from Arizona to Tennessee in his mobile home.

In 2006, agents obtained a court order – but not a warrant – to track the disposable phone’s location using its GPS.

After tracing the phone’s exact location, police dogs discovered the mobile home and indicated a presence of drugs. “Big Foot” was arrested and charged for drug trafficking and conspiracy to commit money laundering.

But on appeal, the defendant argued that his cell phone data could not be used because the DEA failed to obtain a warrant for it, thereby violating the Fourth Amendment.

The Fourth Amendment protects against “unreasonable searches and seizures” without the issuance of a warrant obtained due to probable cause.

The Court considers cell phone use to be a public – not private – action, thereby being ineligible for the protections of the Fourth Amendment. A court brief of the case states that “a suspect’s presence in a publicly observable place is not information subject to Fourth Amendment protection.”

Additionally, Judge John M. Rogers, writing for the majority, said Skinner “did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the data given off by his voluntarily procured pay-as-you-go cell phone. If a tool used to transport contraband gives off a signal that can be tracked for location, certainly the police can track the signal.”

While any US cell phone can now be tracked by police without probable cause or a warrant, the Supreme Court ruled earlier this year that police must obtain a warrant before secretly attacking a GPS tracking device to a suspect’s car.

That ruling is currently being contested, leaving the possibility for police to secretly track vehicles without permission. Without the requirement of a warrant to access cell phone data, US authorities are gaining increasing power over what some would consider “private” rights of individuals – but what the Courts call “public.”

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The University of Texas’ Weak Affirmative-Action Defense

Friday, August 10th, 2012

On Monday, as Peter Schmidt noted in the Chronicle, the University of Texas at Austin filed its brief with the U.S. Supreme Court defending the use of racial preferences in admissions. Like the brief of the petitioner, Abigail Fisher, the UT Austin argument is pitched directly at the likely swing vote on the Supreme Court, Justice Anthony Kennedy. I doubt it will be persuasive.

UT Austin faces an uphill battle because the Supreme Court has long held that race can be used to promote diversity in higher education only if it is “necessary”; Kennedy has emphasized that race should be used as a “last resort,” where race-neutral means won’t suffice. For years, supporters of affirmative action argued that no workable alternatives existed for creating racial diversity. In the words of Justice Harry Blackmun’s opinion in the 1978 Bakke case: “I suspect that it would be impossible to arrange an affirmative action program in a racially neutral way and have it successful. To ask that this be so is to demand the impossible. In order to get beyond racism, we must first take account of race. There is no other way.”

But UT Austin did find another way. As the UT brief acknowledges, in the fall of 1996, using race in admissions, UT Austin’s freshman class was 4.1 percent African American and 14.5 percent Hispanic. When UT Austin was temporarily barred from using race by a lower court, it adopted a socioeconomic affirmative-action plan and a program to admit students in the top 10 percent of every high-school class which resulted, in 2004, in a freshman class that was 4.5 percent African American and 16.9 percent Hispanic—marginally more diverse than under the race-based plan.

Faced with these facts, the UT Austin brief makes two central arguments to suggest that its race-neutral plans were nevertheless inadequate, justifying the reinsertion of race after 2004. First, UT suggests that diversity at the school-wide level is insufficient; what’s truly important is diversity at the classroom level. Even with the 2004 levels of diversity, there were thousands of classroom in which black and Latino students “were nearly non-existent,” the brief argues.

Second, UT suggests, the class-based affirmative-action and top-10-percent plans didn’t produce sufficient levels of socioeconomic diversity within the student body’s black and Latino communities. Those admitted through the 10-percent plan were more likely “to be the first in their families to attend college,” for example, than those admitted through a racial preference. Having wealthier black and Latino students in the mix, Texas argues, is critical to the process of “breaking down racial stereotypes” that other students might have.

Will these arguments fly with the Supreme Court? Shifting the traditional focus from schoolwide diversity to classroom diversity seems unlikely to convince a majority of the justices, as there are mathematical challenges to ever ensuring a critical mass of students in all classrooms. {snip}

And the argument for using race to admit more advantaged students of color highlights the very weakest moral argument for affirmative action. President Obama himself recognized this when he suggested that his own daughters, as fairly privileged students, do not deserve an affirmative-action preference.

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For now, Md. police can take DNA from charged criminals, Supreme Court says

Tuesday, July 31st, 2012

Police in Maryland can resume collecting DNA from suspects charged — but not yet convicted — in violent crimes, and the U.S. Supreme Court might be inclined to let them do so permanently.

U.S. Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. issued an opinion Monday saying there is a “fair prospect” the court will overturn the Maryland Court of Appeals controversial Alonzo Jay King Jr. v State of Maryland decision, which prohibited DNA collection from suspects charged — but not yet convicted — in violent crimes and burglaries. And until the nation’s highest court can more thoroughly consider the issue, Roberts put the King decision on hold — meaning police in Maryland can resume collecting DNA.

“This stay will allow Maryland the uninterrupted use of this critical modern law enforcement tool that helps police and prosecutors solve some of Maryland’s most serious violent crimes,” Maryland Attorney General Douglas F. Gansler said in a statement.

The Supreme Court’s opinion is the latest development in an ongoing debate over whether — and when — it is legal to collect DNA from criminal suspects. Federal and state courts across the country have issued mixed opinions. The governor’s office says 26 states have legislation similar to Maryland’s.

It is precisely because of that debate that the Supreme Court intervened. In his opinion, Roberts wrote that the Maryland Court of Appeals decision conflicts with decisions by two other federal appellate courts, as well as a decision by Virginia’s Supreme Court. Roberts wrote that “given the considered analysis of the courts on the other side of the split, there is a fair prospect that this Court will reverse” the King decision.

Stephen Mercer, the chief attorney for the Maryland Office of the Public Defender’s Forensics Division, said the opinion is merely a “preliminary round” in an ongoing legal fight.

“We continue to believe the court, in the end, will vindicate the Fourth Amendment rights of Mr. King and all Marylanders in their right to genetic privacy,” Mercer said.

The case centers on a Maryland law, which, starting in 2009, allowed police to collect DNA from suspects after they were charged with violent crimes or burglaries. Before then, police had been able to collect DNA only from convicted criminals.

Alonzo Jay King Jr. challenged the law after he was arrested in April 2009 on assault charges. Prosecutors used a DNA swab from that case to connect him to a 2003 rape. He was eventually convicted and sentenced to life in prison for the rape.

The Maryland Court of Appeals sent King’s case back to the circuit court and threw out the DNA evidence, saying investigators violated his Fourth Amendment rights in taking his genetic material and comparing it with old crime scene samples. The ruling was condemned by prosecutors and police chiefs, who said it would hamper detectives’ ability to solve cold cases and jeopardize the convictions of 34 robbers, burglars and rapists whose genetic samples were taken after they were charged in separate cases.

On the advice of the attorney general’s office, police suspended DNA collection in the wake of the ruling. Now, it seems, they will be able to start collecting again. In his opinion, Roberts wrote that the Maryland Court of Appeals ruling creates “an ongoing and concrete harm to Maryland’s law enforcement and public safety interests” — even if it is only in effect for a matter of months.

Without a stay, “Maryland would be disabled from employing a valuable law enforcement tool for several months — a tool used widely throughout the country and one that has been upheld by two Courts of Appeals and another state high court,” Roberts wrote.

The Supreme Court had already temporarily stayed the decision while it waited for input from the Maryland Public Defender’s Office. In its filing opposing the stay, the public defender’s office argued that the King ruling was not causing any immediate harm, noting that Maryland’s attorney general had waited nearly eight weeks to ask for a stay.

 

Maryland authorities must file a petition for certiorari to have the Supreme Court consider whether to overturn the King ruling. In his statement, Gansler said he intends to do that next month.

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White supremacist can seek help online in attempt to prove racist claims: court

Wednesday, July 4th, 2012

Facing charges for online hate speech, a Regina neo-Nazi leader has been given a judge’s permission to go back online to white supremacist websites for help in proving that the anti-Semitic and racist comments are true.

The court order gives Terry Tremaine permission to ask for information from denizens of online forums, some of which are notorious for virulent messages of intolerance, suggesting his eventual criminal trial could become a controversial marathon like Ernst Zundel’s and Jim Keegstra’s attempts to prove the Holocaust was a fraud.

Mr. Tremaine, a former math lecturer at the University of Saskatchewan, faces 11 criminal charges of wilfully promoting hate against identifiable groups after prolific postings, including messages saying Jews are a “parasitic race,” that “blacks are intellectually inferior to whites” and “Hitler was a lot nicer to the Jews than they deserved.”

Police raided Mr. Tremaine’s Regina home in 2007. He is head of the National-Socialist Party of Canada, which uses the Nazi swastika and pictures of Adolf Hitler to promote itself.

“They are holding Mr. Tremaine accountable for thousands upon thousands of thousands of statements of fact, statements of opinion, statements of mixed fact and opinion,” Doug Christie, Mr. Tremaine’s lawyer, said in an interview.

“Some of them — some of them — not all of them [but] certainly some of the facts are verifiable,” he said.

“Consequently, there are many possible defences,” including truth.

The relaxing of bail conditions to allow for a ‘search for truth’? You can label it that, but it is basically a search for propaganda

Mr. Christie sought changes to Mr. Tremaine’s bail restrictions to allow him to seek information from “any website” to plan his legal defence. He had previously been banned from such communication.

Saskatchewan’s Court of Queen’s Bench Justice Frederick Kovach consented, signing an order on June 27 allowing Mr. Tremaine to once again post messages on controversial web sites such as Stormfront, a U.S.-based white supremacist web forum run by former Ku Klux Klansman Don Black, where the original contentious posts were made.

Judge Kovach, however, imposed some restrictions.

Mr. Tremaine may only post questions “pertaining to research for the preparation of his defence,” the order reads, and each message must first be vetted by the Crown prosecutor in the case. A notation of the court order must precede all messages and conclude with: “Please address only the question if possible, as I cannot engage in discussions of any other nature.”

His specific questions have not yet been submitted.

The court order further requires Mr. Tremaine to use his real name in the postings without pseudonyms, including “Mathdoktor99,” his former online alias.

Even with the restrictions, Judge Kovach’s order could hand Mr. Tremaine a platform to further spread his “hateful view of the world,” said David Matas, senior honourary legal counsel for B’nai Brith Canada, a Jewish advocacy group.

“I find it troubling,” said Mr. Matas. “The relaxing of bail conditions to allow for a ‘search for truth’? You can label it that, but it is basically a search for propaganda to justify his own prejudicial beliefs.

“If you allow the court to become a platform [for hateful views] and you combined it with low penalties, it actually becomes an incentive for propagandists to go to court rather than a disincentive.”

Mr. Tremaine previously elected trial by a judge and jury rather than judge alone. A date is not yet scheduled.

He faces the same charge as Jim Keegstra, a former Alberta school teacher convicted in 1984 for teaching his students that the Holocaust was a fraud and Jews are “treacherous.” Mr. Keegstra argued truth as his defence but had his conviction confirmed by the Supreme Court of Canada.

Ernst Zundel was charged with spreading false news for publishing “Did Six Million Really Die?” that denied the genocide of Jews by Nazi Germany. He faced two trials in 1985 and 1988 that drew intense attention to his views. He was found guilty at trial but later had his conviction overturned by the Supreme Court.

If you allow the court to become a platform [for hateful views] and you combined it with low penalties, it actually becomes an incentive for propagandists to go to court

Mr. Christie represented both men.

He said Mr. Tremaine’s use of the Internet differentiates this case.

“The Keegstra case was vastly different in that Mr. Keegstra was speaking to a captive audience of students who had no choice but to listen. The Internet does not communicate, in my respectful opinion, it makes available. It does not transmit to anyone who does not seek it. It is a different situation,” Mr. Christie said.

Previously, a Federal Court of Canada judge declared that Mr. Tremaine was “a white supremacist” who was “virulently anti-Jewish” and “has particular enmity for blacks and Canada’s aboriginal peoples.”

“Mr. Tremaine thinks — or perhaps just wishes — he is better than others because of the colour of his skin. He is a white supremacist,” wrote Justice Sean Harrington last year in a separate case stemming from his online postings.

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Neo-Nazi case won’t be heard by Supreme Court

Friday, April 27th, 2012

Canada‘s top court will not hear an appeal in a case involving a neo-Nazi leader’s web postings that could have determined the power of Canada’s quasi-judicial human rights tribunals.

 

Regina’s Terry Tremaine, the head of the National-Socialist Party of Canada and a former university math lecturer, was found in contempt of court by the Federal Court of Appeal in November 2011 for refusing to remove web postings he made about blacks, Jews and First Nations people.

 

He had previously flouted a ruling by the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal that found his postings were hate speech and ordered that he stop posting discriminatory messages and pay a $4,000 fine.

 

The tribunal, like other similar bodies that operate in parallel with Canada’s criminal and civil law systems, can impose financial penalties and even jail time, but its powers to enforce rulings are limited.

 

That was a point not lost on Tremaine, who declined to remove his Internet postings.

 

Tremaine claimed that the tribunal had no power to enforce the ruling.

 

He was then found in contempt of court, and his appeals argued that the commission’s quasi-judicial status meant it was not technically court he could be in contempt of.

 

Made under the moniker “mathdoktor99,” Tremaine’s postings called Jews a “parasitic race” and said “blacks are intellectually inferior to whites” and “Hitler was a lot nicer to the Jews than they deserved,” according to the tribunal’s judgment.

 

The Federal Court of Appeal in November, and now the Supreme Court, breathed new life into the ability of quasi-judicial tribunals — not only those dealing with human rights — to issue orders that must be complied with.

 

The November decision gave tribunals the full weight of the law, and it now stands as the final word on the case.

 

Tremaine must comply with the tribunal’s order or face penalties for contempt of court.

 

In a burdensome process, the Canadian Human Rights Commission, which prosecutes cases at the tribunal, registers tribunal orders in Federal Court to give them the weight of court authority.

 

The maximum penalty is five years in prison and a fine of any amount.

 

During a hearing in 2011, Tremaine told a lower court that he felt compelled to ignore the order.

 

“My purpose in ignoring the cease and desist order was to address the urgent matter of impending white extinction,” he said.

 

The National-Socialist Party of Canada uses the Nazi swastika and images of Adolf Hitler to promote itself.

 

Until the rights complaint, Tremaine was a lecturer at the University of Saskatchewan, where he taught a first-year math course.

 

As is its custom, the Supreme Court gave no reason for its decision not to hear the case.

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9th Circuit rejects inmate’s free-speech claim

Tuesday, April 10th, 2012

A federal appeals court avoided the question of whether Oregon prison officials violated an inmate’s First Amendment rights when they punished him for “posting” letters supporting his white-supremacist gang. The 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals simply sidestepped the larger constitutional question by concluding that the prison officials were entitled to qualified immunity because the law was not clearly established.

Jacob Barrett, formerly housed at the Oregon State Penitentiary, contended that officials violated his free-speech rights for disciplining him for the content of his letters. Officials said Barrett, now imprisoned in Oklahoma, had been disciplined for “posting” letters in support of the Aryan Soldiers, a prison gang in which officials believed Barrett was a member. The word “posting” in the opinion leaves it unclear whether Barrett mailed or tried to mail the letters, or whether he displayed them in the prison in some manner.

Barrett argued that the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Procunier v. Martinez(1974) supported his claim. In Procunier, the Court invalidated several prison-mail rules of the California Department of Corrections, which had allowed officials to censor inmate mail if it contained “exaggerated complaints, magnified grievances” or “expressions of inflammatory political, racial or religious views.” The Court struck down the rules because they allowed officials to censor any prisoner letters they wanted.

A federal district court rejected Barrett’s claims. On appeal, a three-judge panel of the 9th Circuit unanimously affirmed the lower court in its April 6 decision inBarrett v. Belleque. The 9th Circuit recognized the Procunier precedent but distinguished it from Barrett’s case:

“Procunier … did not address whether inmates can be disciplined for posting letters directing hostile and abusive language to and at prison staff, which the defendants here reasonably believed Barrett to have done.  Rules prohibiting inmates from directing disrespectful comments toward staff indisputably further legitimate penological interests in security, order and rehabilitation.”

 

However, the appeals court stopped short of addressing the First Amendment claim in detail. Instead, it took a shortcut sanctioned by the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Pearson v. Callahan (2009) — a Fourth Amendment case in which the court made it easier for judges to decide cases on qualified-immunity grounds.

Qualified immunity” means government officials are not liable for constitutional violations unless they violate clearly established constitutional or statutory law. The idea behind qualified immunity is that it would be unfair to impose liability on public officials when they reasonably believed they were acting lawfully.

In Saucier v. Katz (2001), the Supreme Court had ruled that in cases where a qualified-immunity defense arises, a reviewing court must follow a two-step process. First, the court must determine whether the facts as alleged by the plaintiff constitute a violation of a constitutional right. Second, the court must determine whether, at the time of the conduct in question, that right was clearly established.

In Pearson, the Court ruled that judges can avoid the first question — whether a constitutional right has been violated — and simply decide a case on the clearly established grounds. It’s possible that federal judges will rule in at least some First Amendment cases on qualified-immunity grounds by deciding simply whether the right was clearly established — without addressing the question of whether certain government conduct violates the First Amendment in the first place.

That is what happened in Jacob Barrett’s case. The appeals court avoided deciding the First Amendment question — something that could come up in many other prison-mail disputes. Instead, it took the easy way out.

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