Posts Tagged ‘German’

World War II in the West (1940-41)

Saturday, November 10th, 2012

On April 9, 1940, Germany simultaneously invaded Norway and occupied Denmark, and the war began in earnest. On May 10, German forces swept through Belgium and the Netherlands in what became known as “blitzkrieg,” or lightning war. Three days later, Hitler‘s troops crossed the Meuse River and struck French forces at Sedan, located at the northern end of the Maginot Line, an elaborate chain of fortifications constructed after World War I and considered an impenetrable defensive barrier. In fact, the Germans broke through the line with their tanks and planes and continued to the rear, rendering it useless. The British Expeditionary Force (BEF) was evacuated by sea from Dunkirk in late May, while in the south French forces mounted a doomed resistance. With France on the verge of collapse, Benito Mussolini of Italy put his Pact of Steel with Hitler into action, and Italy declared war against France and Britain on June 10.

On June 14, German forces entered Paris; a new government formed by Marshal Philippe Petain (France’s hero of World War I) requested an armistice two nights later. France was subsequently divided into two zones, one under German military occupation and the other under Petain’s government, installed at Vichy. Hitler now turned his attention to Britain, which had the defensive advantage of being separated from the Continent by the English Channel. To pave the way for an amphibious invasion (dubbed Operation Sea Lion), German planes bombed Britain extensively throughout the summer of 1940, including night raids on London and other industrial centers that caused heavy civilian casualties and damage. The Royal Air Force (RAF) eventually defeated the Luftwaffe (German Air Force) in the Battle of Britain, and Hitler postponed his plans to invade. With Britain’s defensive resources pushed to the limit, Prime Minister Winston Churchill began receiving crucial aid from the U.S. under the Lend-Lease Act, passed by Congress in early 1941.

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Norse Week

Saturday, October 27th, 2012
Days German’s Days Anglo-Saxon Days
(Old English)
Roman Days
Sunday sunnuntag sunnandæg dies solis (Sol’s day)
Monday monandæg dies lunae (Luna’s day)
Tuesday týsdagr (Tiwaz‘s day) Tiwesdæg dies Martis (Mars‘ day)
Wednesday (Wodan‘s day) Wodnesdæg dies Mercurii (Mercury‘s day)
Thursday (Thor’s day) Thursdæg dies Iovis (Jupiter’s day)
Friday friatag (Frija‘s day) frigedæg dies Veneris (Venus’ day)
Saturday Sæternesdæg dies Saturni (Saturn’s day)

 

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Bombers: Germany, Zeppelins

Saturday, October 13th, 2012

Balloonshad been used in wars prior to the First World War, notably by the Americans in the civil war and the French during the siege of Paris in 1870.  This technology had been advanced by the development of dirigibles – cigar shaped airships with frames, containing many gas balloons.  Powered with multiple engines, these craft could be flown in specific directions rather than just follow the direction of the wind.

Germany had two dirigible manufacturers, the Schutte-Lanz Company, and the larger and better known Zeppelin Company.  The latter was headed by Ferdinand von Zeppelin, the world’s foremost designer of airships.  To this day his name remains synonymous with dirigibles in general.

Airships of his design had already proven themselves capable of flying as far as England and back.  This fact was not lost on the Allies, who from the very outset targeted the airship sheds.  It was also not lost on the British public, where rumours and reported sightings of Zeppelins were frequent, though unfounded, throughout 1914.

At the outbreak of the war the German army had six operational dirigibles, and the navy had one.  The army was quick to experiment with them – bombing Liege and Antwerp - despite the fact that at this stage no specially designed aerial bombs existed.  But the army’s initial experience was not encouraging – they lost three airships in the first months of the war to anti aircraft fire.

Despite this the navy was very enthusiastic.  They saw the Zeppelin as a solution to their reconnaissance problems.  If the army traditionally used the cavalry for reconnaissance, the navy traditionally used the light cruiser.  Germany had very few such ships, and an airship was viewed as being cheaper and less vulnerable.

Framework of a Zeppelin shot down over England, 23 Sep 1916Under the command of Korvettenkapitan Peter Strasser the navy quickly acquired more airships.  Throughout 1914 these were used for reconnaissance patrols over the North Sea, but the German Admiralty was pressing for permission to use them for attacks against England.  The Kaiser, somewhat reluctantly, granted such permission and on the 19th of January the Germans carried out the first Zeppelin raid against Britain, killing two and injuring sixteen.

This was the first of many raids, which continued at a rate of about two per month, in parallel with the continuing reconnaissance patrols.  The German Admiralty was very enthusiastic about the results, and asked for permission to bomb London.  This was only granted by the Kaiser after a series of raids by French bombers on German cities.  On the 31st of May 1915 the first raid was carried out against London, killing seven and injuring thirty five.

The most successful Zeppelin raid on London in the entire war was on the 8th of September 1915.  This raid caused more than half a million pounds of damage, almost all of it from the one Zeppelin, the L13, which managed to bomb central London.  This single raid caused more than half the material damage caused by all the raids against Britain in 1915.

On the night of 6-7 June 1915 Rex Warneford, a lieutenant in the RNAS, flying a Morane-Saulnier, was on a bombing mission against the Zeppelin sheds at Evere.  When he spotted a Zeppelin returning from a bombing raid against London he decided to attack it.  He tried shooting his carbine at it, his only armament, but he was driven off by the Zeppelin’s defensive machine guns.

The airship began climbing, leaving the little plane behind, but Warneford, unbeknown to the Zeppelin crew, continued the pursuit, climbing slowly over two hours to an altitude of 13,000 feet.  At this stage the airship began to descend in the direction of Brussels, and seizing his opportunity Warneford, now above the Zeppelin, dived towards it and from about two hundred feet above he dropped his six bombs on its roof.

Effects of Zeppelin attack on AntwerpThe resultant explosion destroyed the Zeppelin, and almost destroyed Warneford’s fragile monoplane.

He was forced to put the plane down, behind enemy lines, but he managed to make sufficient emergency repairs to take off again and return to his base.  LZ 37 was the first Zeppelin brought down by an airplane.

Warneford was awarded the Victoria Cross by the British, and the Knight’s Cross of the Legion d’Honneur by the French, but his triumph was short-lived.  He was killed ten days later in a flying accident.

This was an isolated incident.  Throughout the remainder of 1915 the Zeppelins raided London frequently, and with impunity.  They flew too high for most planes, and when they were intercepted by aircraft the ammunition in use at the time had little effect.  Despite this impunity the material effect of the raids, with the exception of L13′s success, was relatively slight.

Navigation was very primitive, and as the war progressed the British use of blackouts made it even harder.  Bomb aiming was far from accurate.  It is estimated that only 10% of the bombs dropped from Zeppelins actually hit their target.  The psychological impact of these raids, however, was enough to cause the British to tie up 12 squadrons on home defence.

The Germans also bombed Paris.  The first raid was on 21st of March, when two Zeppelins caused 23 deaths and injured 30.  Although the Zeppelins continued to raid Paris, London was actually a preferred and easier target.  The nearest Zeppelin base to Paris was at Metz, which meant flying close to 320 km (200 miles) over French territory each way, giving the defending airforce and anti-aircraft guns much more time to organize.

Raids against London had to cover nearly twice the distance, but most of the approach was over friendly territory and the sea.  Paris was also protected by barrage balloons, a measure only taken by the British later in the war.

Ferdinand von Zeppelin1916 did not start well for the Zeppelins.  Four of them were lost carrying out bombing raids during the Battle of Verdun, and this marked the last use of airships for tactical bombing.  But Strasser remained confident.  The Zeppelin factory was producing a new generation of airships – larger, more powerful, and with more engines.

But it was also a year of change on the British side as well.  Disappointment with the RNAS’ failure to stop the Zeppelins resulted in the responsibility of home defence being given to the RFC.  Happily for them this coincided with the arrival of improved ammunition.

Towards mid 1916 the British planes were armed with a mixture of explosive and incendiary bullets.  This mixture would prove to be deadly to the airships: the explosive bullets could pierce the Zeppelin’s tough outer skin and cause leaks on the inner gas bags.  The incendiary bullets could set those leaks on fire, and once on fire a Zeppelin was doomed.

William Leefe-Robinson, flying a BE2c, was the first to shoot down a dirigible over Britain, on the 2nd of September, 1916.  The massive fire of the burning airship was visible for over a hundred miles.  This was during a raid of twelve naval airships which were, somewhat unusually, accompanied by four army airships.  Leefe-Robinson became an instant hero.  He survived the war, only to die a month later in the influenza epidemic.

Strasser’s confidence remained unshaken.  Leefe-Robinson had shot down the SL11.  It was an army airships, not one of Strasser’s, and moreover an old Schutte-Lanz dirigible with a wooden frame.

William Leefe-RobinsonBut Strasser’s confidence was misplaced.  Three weeks later he was to lose two airships, out of a total of twelve taking part in a raid.  There were no comforting explanations.  They were naval airships.  They were the most up to date Zeppelins available.

The L33 had been hit by anti aircraft fire.  She did not catch fire, but she was forced to land in England.  The crew all survived, and set her alight before capture.  The L32 was shot down by a plane, and as in the case of Leefe-Robinson’s SL11, it caught fire.  Nor were these the last losses in 1916.

Despite flying almost four times as many sorties as in 1915, and dropping almost five times as many bombs, Strasser’s fleet caused only about two thirds as much damage as they had in 1915.

The German military was becoming disillusioned with the Zeppelins, and began using the new Gotha and Giant bombers to attack Britain, but Strasser remained convinced.  The answer was to fly higher, above the defending aircraft.  Thus was conceived the third generation of Zeppelins, the “Height Climbers”, airships capable of reaching an altitude of 20,000 feet.

In order to reach these heights defensive armaments were reduced, as was the strength of the frame.  Flying at such altitudes produced a whole new set of problems.  The extreme cold and thin oxygen affected both the engines, and the crew’s capability to function.

Bomb aiming and navigation became even harder.  But with the renewed immunity the height seemed to offer, it seemed worth the price.  Indeed, when on the night of October 19th 1917 a fleet of eleven Height-Climbers crossed the English coast they were too high to be heard, and their raid was a total surprise.

But on the return journey, over the European mainland, almost half the airships were shot down by British and French fighter aircraft as they descended towards landing.  The L55 had attempted to avoid this risk by keeping at 20,000 feet till it had cleared the western front, but this caused other problems.  The morning sun heating the hydrogen forced the L55 to a record-breaking 24,000 feet.  With most of the crew disabled by oxygen deprivation it was a struggle to bring her under almost partial control.  The L55 crash landed in central Germany.

The total amount of material damage caused by the airships in 1917 was less than 90,000 pounds.

1918 started badly for the beleaguered airship fleet, when a series of unexplained explosions at the airship base in Ahlhorn blew up four Height-Climbers, one Schutte-Lanz airship, and four sheds.  German manufacturing by this time had been greatly reduced, and they could not replenish such losses.

Hugo Eckener, Ferdinand von Zeppelin, Peter StrasserOn the 5th of August Strasser himself led the last big raid against Britain, leading a fleet of five Height-Climbers.  Strasser was flying in L70 – his most advanced airship, capable, he hoped, of flying bombing missions against New York.  But by this time the British had aircraft that could operate at about 20,000 feet as well, and L70 succumbed to a two man DH4 piloted by Egbert Cadbury.  (He was a member of the famous chocolate manufacturing family.)

The fatal shots were fired by his gunner, Robert Leckie, whose hands were almost frozen because he had not had time to put on gloves when he and Cadbury had scrambled to chase the Zeppelins.  The rest of the airships dropped their bombs on what they thought were “targets of opportunity”, but in fact they dropped them in the sea.

The Zeppelin attacks had a profound psychological impact on the Allies.  The Germans were ordered, under the treaty of Versailles, to hand over all their airships, but their crews preferred to destroy as many of them as they could.

The need to tie up numerous squadron in home defence can be marked as the Zeppelin’s greatest achievement, for as a weapon of war they proved themselves unsatisfactory.  Of the 115 Zeppelins employed by the Germans, 53 were destroyed and a further 24 were too damaged to be operational.  Strasser’s crews suffered a 40% loss rate.  The cost of constructing those 115 Zeppelins was approximately five times the cost of the damage they inflicted.

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The Battle of Sandfontein, 1914

Thursday, October 11th, 2012

The campaigns in Africa, especially in the deserts of Namibia, were dominated by supplies, or lack thereof, of water.

South African General Sir Henry Lukin ought to have realized that the Germans wouldn’t let the wells of Sandfontein be captured without a fight the moment his column, known as Force A, occupied the watering hole in early September, but it didn’t unduly concern him or any of the British colony’s generals.

The commander of Germany‘s Schutztruppe (colonial defence force), Heydebreck, was a far better tactician and general.  The Schutztruppe of German South West Africa would provide a brilliant resistance that would incorporate native troops, German troops, and aircraft into a problematic front for the British high command.

Command of the German colony would make a Boer rebellion under Manie Maritz a possibility that would deny Great Britain many South African reinforcements in vital fronts such as 1914 Belgium and France, and East Africa.

In the end, however, numbers prevailed and in June 1915 the colony was surrendered by governor Seitz to Boer general Botha who commanded 60,000 troops and acted as the British representative.

The 1914 portion of the campaign was marked mainly with a string of German victories, despite the landing of 8,000 enemy troops at Luederitzbucht.  The most notable of these battles took place at Sandfontein, and opened on 26 September 1914.  The British, both Lukin and Colonel Grant, ought to have detected the German trap, but fortunately for the Germans they were entirely ignorant of it.

A large force of 135 officers, 2,463 soldiers, and 522 natives 4 thirteen pounder guns and 4,347 animals marched to the water.  The men had gone a long time in the hot sun without water, and the animals were near collapse from dehydration, and consequently little protection was set up as all the men and animals stood gathering water, with the entire formation exposed to the surrounding heights where the Germans hid.

The Germans pounced with a lesser force of 1,700 riflemen, mostly native, but all officers were German, and 4 machine gun teams and 10 artillery pieces.  After stocking up on water, a patrol was sent out, and soon returned with heavy losses and under heavy fire.  The Schutztruppe laid down a deadly cover of machine gun fire and advanced through the rocky hills toward the enemy at the wells.

Colonel Grant, whose force had come to reinforce Lukin’s small police garrison, now took command.  He made an organized and successful retreat to a defensive perimeter around the nearby Kopje mountain.  There was only a small building there and it was turned into a hospital and stable for the animals.  Mobility for the South Africans became a major problem with heavy machine gun fire pouring all over the mountain, one of the German guns was extremely well placed and had an excellent range of fire with good defences and caused significant numbers of casualties.

The South Africans soon found that their telephone lines back to Ramans Drift had all been cut.  They were surrounded with no way to call for reinforcements.  The South African artillery, placed near the base of the mountain next to the improvised hospital, opened up and stung back at the Germans, but the German artillery returned with greater fire.  The South African guns may have been outnumbered, but they continually repositioned and were extremely effective in determining range.  They returned far more fire than expected, but were eventually knocked out.

The German guns then moved forward to within 1,200 yards of the northern face of Mount Kopje.  The Germans commenced lobbing shells into the South African position, and the machine gun fire continued.  The South Africans couldn’t even return fire, despite multiple attempts.  Only half an hour after the Germans brought their guns foreword, the South Africans hoisted a white flag, and the engagement ended.

The second the fire ceased, both German and South African troops raced for the wells in no-man’s land where they congregated with great friendliness.  A later South African account congratulated von

Heydebreck on his chivalry in dealing with his newly acquired prisoners.  He sat and discussed the battle with Grant and congratulated him on his gallant defence.

When it came to burying the dead, the Germans gave the same honours to the enemy dead as they did their own.  Heydebreck did what seemed impossible, he took an outnumbered force and ambushed the enemy with such overwhelming fire that they didn’t even have the ability to attempt a break out, and then pummelled them with artillery, machine gun fire, and constant raids that forced them to surrender.  He was another example of how German commanders at the start of the First World War far surpassed the capabilities of their enemy counterparts.

Shortly after his great victory, Heydebreck died in an unfortunate accident.  His replacement was Lieutenant Colonel Franke, who showed skill that in some respects surpassed that of Germany’s other great generals of Africa.

Shortly after taking command he stormed the South African fort Nautilia with just 600 men and decisively defeated the 800 man garrison.  It was the last in a string of the German colony’s notable victories.  Between the two German victories, air power was deployed to great effect.  The three German aircraft in the colony performed reconnaissance and bombing runs.

In one instance improvised bombs were made out of stovepipes and artillery shells were dropped on the enemy at Haalen Burg on two separate occasions.  The first on the 12th of November failed, but a second on the 29th succeeded in wounding four men, killing a fifth, and damaging some vital heavy artillery equipment.  Similar air raids took place in other regions of German controlled Namibia.

Eventually the Schutztruppe succumbed to the enemy’s numbers, around 60,000, and surrendered after more than a year of effective resistance.  With the surrender, Germany lost control of perhaps the most profitable of her colonies.  Namibia, to this day, remains a valuable source of diamond and copper mining.  Despite the rocky desert that covered most of the country, much of the land provided excellent farming capabilities.

In the end, the campaigns of German South West Africa proved successful for the Germans in that it delayed the mobilisation of South African troops against the stronger German presence in East Africa, and prevented any shipment of South African troops to Europe during the decisive battles of 1914.

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The Battle of Lorraine, 1914

Tuesday, October 9th, 2012

The French invasion of Lorraine formed one of the major objectives of the French pre-war offensive strategy against Germany, Plan XVII A consequence of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71, the loss of Alsace and Lorraine to Prussia festered in the minds of both French public and military alike, a national humiliation that needed to be addressed during the next war with the Prussians.

Plan XVII therefore made the recovery of Alsace and Lorraine a central plank of French strategy This much was known to Germany before the First World War began, and was consequently factored into the German Schlieffen Plan.

One of the Battles of the Frontiers, the Invasion of Lorraine (also known as the Battle of Morhange-Sarrebourg) began with the French First and Second Armies entering the city on 14 August 1914, despite the failure of General Paul Pau’s 8 August offensive at the Battle of Mulhouse, another key target near the Swiss border, with his ‘Army of Alsace’.

The French First Army, under General Auguste Dubail, intended to take Sarrebourg, east of Nancy, a strongly defended town, with General Noel de Castelnau’s Second Army taking Morhange, similarly fortified The task of defending these towns fell to German Crown Prince Rupprecht, who had overall command of the German Sixth and General Josias von Herringen’s Seventh Army.

Rupprecht implemented a strategy of apparently retreating under the force of the French attack, only to bounce back in a fierce, cleverly manoeuvred counter-attack, having lured the French armies into a strong attack upon a heavily defended position As the French armies advanced they encountered increasingly stern German opposition, including treacherous machine gun fireand heavy artillery.

Crown Prince RupprechtRupprecht, however, pressed German Army Chief of Staff Helmuth von Moltke to authorise a more aggressive strategy, under which the Germans would mount a counter-attack, the aim being to drive the French back to Nancy.

With Moltke’s agreement the offensive was launched on 20 August, whilst de Castelnau’s Second Army battered Morhange Caught by surprise and without the assistance of an entrenched position, Second Army was forced to fall back, eventually into France itself.

This in turn obliged General Dubail to retreat his First Army from Sarrebourg. Despite the German onslaught Ferdinand Foch’s XX Corps managed to defend Nancy itself.

Gaps began to appear between the French armies, prompting Commander-in-Chief Joseph Joffreto withdraw the Army of Alsace – a bitter blow given the latter’s recent success in retaking Mulhouse.

Eight days after the French offensive had begun, 22 August, both First and Second Armies were back to the fortress zones of Belfort, Epinal and Toul.

Diverting from the Schlieffen Plan, Rupprecht’s forces were reinforced preparatory to an attack against the two French armies through the Trouee des Charmes, a natural gap between Epinal and Toul. However the French, through the successful use of reconnaissance aircraft, were alerted to the German’s build-up and so prepared an adequate defence. Attacked therefore on 24 August, German gains were minimal, limited to the acquisition of a small salient into French lines, itself reduced by heavy French counter-attacks on the morning of 25 August.

The French line held Realistically the troops gathered for Rupprecht’s offensive – which comprised 26 divisions of men – would have been put to far greater use at the First Battle of the Marne; however Rupprecht continued fighting until the end of the month, without success Stalemate and trench warfare ensued.

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The Battle of Heligoland Bight, 1914

Friday, October 5th, 2012

Designed by the British as a means of attacking German patrols in the north-west German coast, the encounter at Heligoland Bight on 28 August 1914 comprised the first naval battle of the war.

Commander Tyrwhitt was charged with leading the Harwich Force of two light cruisers, Fearless and Arethusa, accompanied by two flotillas of 31 destroyers, 1st and 3rd Flotillas, in a raid upon German shipping located close to the German naval base at Heligoland.

Acting as cover for Tyrwhitt’s force was the First Battle Cruiser Squadron, recently arrived fromScapa Flow and under the command of Vice Admiral Beatty.  His squadron consisted of the battleships New Zealand and Invincible, plus three battlecruisers.

Tyrwhitt began the action by sinking two German torpedo boats at around 7am on 28 August.  Not entirely surprised by the British attack, the Germans hastily deployed the Frauenlob and the Stettin, joined shortly afterwards by four other light cruisers, including Rear Admiral Mass’s flagship, Koln.

Finding himself outgunned by the German defence and under increasing fire, with the Arethusa heavily damaged, Tyrwhitt called Beatty for urgent assistance at 11.25am.  Beatty, some 40km to the north, hurried to Tyrwhitt’s assistance, arriving at 12.40pm.  In time to save Tyrwhitt, Beatty’s squadron sunk Mainz, Koln, and Ariadne and damaged a further three other cruisers.

Retreating hurriedly under the cover of mist, the Germans had lost 1,200 men, as opposed to just 35 British fatalities.

As a consequence of the action, Beatty enhanced his reputation as a fighting seaman; it also influenced the Admiralty’s decision to appoint Beatty as Commander of the Grand Fleet, replacingSir John Jellicoe, who was summarily dismissed by Lloyd George on Christmas Eve, 1917, in a dispute over the use of convoy shipping.

Beatty’s success however overshadowed deficiencies in the British handling of the encounter, in areas as diverse as planning and communication.

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The Battle of Bolimov, 1915

Monday, September 24th, 2012

An inconclusive battle between the German Ninth Army and the Russian Second Army, the Battle of Bolimov, launched on 31 January 1915, formed part of the third German attack directed against Warsaw and was a necessary preliminary to the Second Battle of the Masurian Lakes.

The attack was centred around the town of Bolimov in the plains to the west of Warsaw.  The German force was led by August von Mackensen and the Russians by Smirnov.

Today the Battle of Bolimov is chiefly remembered as the site of the German army’s first extensive use of poison gas.  Experimental in nature the firing of several thousand gas shells proved entirely unsuccessful.  Not only was the xylyl bromide (a tear gas) blown back towards the German lines, it also failed to vaporise in the freezing temperatures, falling harmlessly to the ground.

In consequence of the gas failure the German attack was called off in failure.  The Russians in turn launched a number of heavy frontal counterattacks by some 11 divisions (led by Vasily Gurko), suffering 40,000 casualties and achieving little, German artillery repulsing the Russian attacks with ease.

Although the Russians were aware that the Germans had attempted an innovation in their use of poison gas, its failure was such that it was not greatly remarked upon at the time, and consequently was not widely reported to Russia’s Allies in the west.

Poison gas was to make its next appearance on the better-suited Western Front, with much greater success, during the Second Battle of Ypres in April 1915.

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The First Battle of the Masurian Lakes, 1914

Monday, September 24th, 2012

Conducted between 9-14 September 1914, the First Battle of the Masurian Lakes (of two, thesecond in February 1915) was the second victory of the war by the Germans over the Russian army, the first occurring at Tannenberg in late August.

Having successfully dealt with the Russian Second Army, commanded by Samsonov, at Tannenberg, Paul von Hindenburg’s Eighth Army – comprising 21 divisions, 18 of infantry, 3 of cavalry – turned their attention to the Russian First Army, commanded by Rennenkampf.  These two armies had been deployed as two arms of a pincer movement intended to snap up Hindenburg’s forces in East Prussia.  With one arm of the pincer broken, Hindenburg determined to neutralise the other in short order.

Hindenburg aimed to encircle Rennenkampf by breaking through a weak flank of the latter’s southern corps who had belatedly moved south to support the Second Army at Tannenberg and who had become somewhat separated from the main body in the west (who had remained passive during the earlier battle).

Rennenkampf’s army was presently moving through the Insterburg Gap between Konigsberg and the Masurian Lakes.  However, upon receiving news of the Second Army’s defeat, Rennenkampf ordered his forces to retreat to a firmer position extending from the Baltic south-east to Angerburg.

Paul von HindenburgA preliminary German attack began on 7 September, lasting two days, launched from either side of the southern lakes, its aim being to push the Russians up towards the coast.  Heavily outnumbered 3-to-1, the Russian forces dispersed, and the German advance continued northwards in pursuit of the main body of the Russian army.

Rennenkampf, who feared being outflanked, consequently authorised a further orderly withdrawal on 9 September, simultaneously ordering a counter-strike at the Germans by two divisions so as to hold up the German advance whilst his men pulled back.

In this Rennenkampf was successful, although with the retreat of his forces East Prussia had been cleared of all Russian troops by 13 September.  Furthermore, Russian casualties during the battle were high: 125,000 compared to the German figure of at most 40,000, although the Germans could ill-afford such high losses in the east.

Yakov Zhilinski, the army group commander responsible for the Russian plan of invasion, was dismissed as a consequence of the Russian army’s perceived poor performance.

The action had resulted in two defeats of the Russian army, and largely removed any threat to German forces stationed in East Prussia, although a Russian counter-attack from 25-28 September (the Battle of the Niemen) forced a German retreat back to the border and resulted in the Russian army retaking much of the ground lost in the First Masurian battle.

As a consequence of Tannenberg and the Masurian Lakes – although the former battle was a much clearer cut victory than the second – Hindenburg was hailed as a hero in Germany, subsequently succeeding Falkenhayn as Chief of the German Staff in late summer 1916.

Despite Hindenburg’s fame at home, his Chief of Staff, Erich Ludendorff, was the chief architect of these, and future, Hindenburg victories.  He followed Hindenburg to Berlin as his quartermaster general upon Hindenburg’s promotion to Army Chief of Staff.

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The Battle of Loos, 1915

Sunday, September 23rd, 2012

The Battle of Loos formed a part of the wider Artois-Loos Offensive conducted by the French and British in autumn 1915, sometimes referred to as the Second Battle of Artois.

The Artois campaigns comprised the major Allied offensive on the Western Front in 1915.

Along with the attack against Loos by the British, French troops launched offensives at Champagne (the Second Battle of Champagne), and at Vimy Ridge in Arras.  The French and British High Command, notably French Commander-in-Chief Joseph Joffre, relied upon numerical supremacy – 3 to 1 in favour of the French at Champagne – to overpower the Germans.

The Loos offensive began on 25 September following a four day artillery bombardment in which 250,000 shells were fired, and was called off in failure on 28 September.  Presided over byDouglas Haig, the British committed six divisions to the attack.  Haig was persuaded to launch the Loos offensive despite serious misgivings.

He was much concerned at both a marked shortage in available shells (sparking the shell shortage scandal in Britain in 1915), and at the fatigued state of his troops; he was further concerned at the nature of the difficult terrain that would need to be crossed.  All considered, he favoured a delay before the offensive at Loos was put underway, while these concerns were addressed.

Set against these concerns however was the reality that the British enjoyed massive numerical supremacy against their German opposition at Loos, in places of 7 to 1.  Once the preliminary artillery bombardment had concluded, Haig’s battle plans called for the release of 5,100 cylinders of chlorine gas (140 tons) from the British front line.  The quantity of gas used was designed to entirely overcome the primitive state of German gas mask design in use at the time.

Unfortunately the release of gas was not without mixed results.  In places the wind blew the gas back into the British trenches, resulting in 2,632 British gas casualties, although only seven actually died.

Haig’s strategy involved the deployment of I and IV Corps in the gap between Loos and the La Bassee Canal, while II and III Corps formed diversionary attacks.  Once the first German position fell reserves from IX Corps, aided by cavalry, would pass through the gap and attack the German second line.

The ruined Church of Ablaire St-Nazaire in ArtoisThe southern section of Haig’s attack, conducted by IV Corps, made significant progress on the first day of the battle, somewhat to Haig’s surprise, capturing Loos and moving onwards towards Lens.  However, supply problems, and a need for reserves brought the advance to a halt at the end of the first day.

Haig had asked the British Commander-in-Chief, Sir John French, to make available IX Corps for potential reserve use the same day, but French had argued that they would not be required until the following morning.  The troops were eventually released during the early afternoon but delays whilst travelling meant they only arrived at night, IX Corps consisting of two ‘New Army’ divisions (21st and 24th), fit but untested in battle.

Meanwhile, north of the Hulloch-Vermelles road, which ran across the battlefield, I Corps made less progress, with the British gas attack far less effective than in the Loos Valley.  Even so, 7th and 9th Divisions managed to establish a foothold on the Hohenzollern Redoubt.

The delay in making available the reserves was however crucial. The Germans, whose lines of defences at Hulloch and Hill 70 were in any case formidable, poured in reserves to counter-attack the following day.  Indeed, the German defences on the second day were stronger than those available at the start of the battle: except that by day two, 26 September, the British no longer had the benefit of a preliminary artillery bombardment.

Advancing towards the Germans that afternoon without covering fire, they were decimated by repeated machine gun fire, the Germans astonished that the attack had been launched without adequate cover.

After several days of sporadic fighting the British were eventually forced to order a retreat.  It was during this battle Rudyard Kipling’s son, John, was lost believed killed; the fact that he was listed as missing sparked a crusade by his parents to locate his body and give it a proper burial, without success.

The Loos attack was renewed by the British on 13 October, when further heavy losses combined with poor weather caused the offensive to be called off.

During the battle the British suffered 50,000 casualties. German casualties were estimated much lower, at approximately half the British total.  The British failure at Loos contributed to Haig’s replacement of French as Commander-in-Chief at the close of 1915.

Elsewhere at Champagne and Vimy Ridge, French progress was initially good, but solid defence by the German Third, Fifth and Sixth Armies (under General EinemCrown Prince Wilhelm andPrince Rupprecht) prevented the French front achieving any long-term gains.

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The Battle of Festubert, 1915

Sunday, September 23rd, 2012

Forming part of French Commander-in-Chief Joseph Joffre’s Artois Offensive in the spring of 1915 – his second large-scale infantry assault following the Champagne Offensive in December 1914 – the Battle of Festubert, in the Ypres Salient, was fought by the Allies (British, Canadian and Indian troops) against the Germans from 15-27 May 1915.

The Festubert attack was launched by Sir Douglas Haig in response to pressure applied to the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) by Joffre, and was the BEF’s second attack during the offensive, following an assault upon Neuve Chapelle four days earlier on 9 May.

Preceded by a four day artillery bombardment by over 400 guns firing 100,000 shells, the attack around the village of Festubert was launched at night on 15 May by two divisions of mostly Indian infantry, and made rapid initial progress, despite the failure of the preliminary bombardment to effectively destroy the German Sixth Army front line defences (under Crown Prince Rupprecht).  Under attack, the Germans retreated to a line directly in front of the village.

A further assault upon these lines, by Canadian troops, was begun on 18 May, but was unsuccessful in the face of German artillery fire.  In heavy rain some Allied troops began to prepare trenches to consolidate the small gains made thus far.  During that same evening the German front line received a further injection of reserves.

Renewed attacks by the Allied forces between 20-24 May resulted in the capture of Festubert village itself, a position held until the German advance of spring 1918.  Despite having captured Festubert however, the Allied forces had advanced less than a kilometre; consequently the attack was ended on 27 May, with the British having suffered some 16,000 casualties during the action.

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